Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

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Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at:

http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-07/

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
□ IKE Phases

- □ Main Mode and Aggressive Mode
- Authentication Methods
- Session Keys
- □ ISAKMP/IKE Encoding and Payload types

□ IKE Version 2


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
- □ Mutual authentication and establish a shared secret
- Features: Hiding end point identifiers, crypto algorithm negotiation
- □ Many modes and phases




IKE Phases

- May need to setup multiple connections with different security properties ⇒ Two phases
- □ Phase 1: Mutual authentication and session keys = IKE SA
- Phase 2: Use results of phase 1 to create multiple associations between the same entities = ESP or AH SA
- □ IKE SA is bi-directional
- □ AH and ESP SAs are unidirectional







IKE Authentication Methods

- 1. Original Public Key Encryption (separately encrypt each field with other sides public key)
- 2. Revised Public Key Encryption (Encrypt session key with public key. Use session key to encrypt the rest)
- 3. Public key signature
- 4. Pre-shared secret key
- 4 Methods \times 2 Modes = 8 variants of Phase 1

Authentication Methods: Comparison


- Public vs. Pre-shared: Public requires sending the certificate first
- □ Public key: Need to reveal the identity
- Encryption vs. Signature keys: Encryption keys may be escrowed. Signature keys are not.
- With signature key, identity may be revealed to an imposter.
- With encryption keys, identity is revealed only to intended entity.

Proof of Identity

- Different for each authentication method
- □ Hash(key, DH value, nonces, crypto choices)
- Could have been the same for all authentication methods
- Integrity check does not cover selected crypto algorithm

IKE Phase 1 Cookies

- Proof of identity in the last message includes hashes of all previous messages
- \Box Need to remember the crypto choices offered \Rightarrow State
- ISAKMP requires cookies to be unique for each connection from the same IP address ⇒ Cannot use stateless cookies
- Connection identifier = <Initiator cookie, responder cookie>
 May end up with the same connection identifier for two connections



DH Parameters

- Modular exponentiation or Elliptic curves
- □ g^a mod p ⇒ Need to select a large prime p and generator g
- □ The group identifiers:
 - > 0 =No group
 - $> 1 = A \mod a resp$ with a 768 bit modulus
 - $> 2 = A \mod exp \ with a \ 1024 \ bit \ modulus$
 - > 3 = A modular exp with a 1536 bit modulus
 - > 4 = An elliptic curve group over $GF[2^{155}]$
 - > 5 = An elliptic curve group over $GF[2^{185}]$

Well-Known Group 1

- □ A 768 bit prime based on digits of π
- $\square 2^{768} 2^{704} 1 + 2^{64} \times \{ [2^{638} \pi] + 149686 \}$

Decimal value:

155251809230070893513091813125848175563133404943451431320235 119490296623994910210725866945387659164244291000768028886422 915080371891804634263272761303128298374438082089019628850917 0691316593175367469551763119843371637221007210577919

Representation in OAKLEY

- □ Type of group: "MODP"
- □ Size of field element (bits): 768

Prime modulus:

Length (32 bit words): 24

Well-Known Group 1 (Cont)

> Data (hex):

Generator: 22 (decimal)

Length (32 bit words): 1

□ See RFC2412 for other well-known groups.

Negotiating Cryptographic Parameters

- Allows negotiating encryption (DES, 3DES, IDEA), hash (MD5, SHA), authentication method (Pre-shared keys, DSS), DH parameters
- Must implement: DES, MD5 and SHA, pre-shared key, modp
- □ Need to send allowed combinations \Rightarrow Large number of choices
- In the aggressive mode, initiator selects a combination. Responder can only reject
- Can also specify a lifetime in terms of time or number of bytes

IKE Session Keys

- \square Phase 1 \Rightarrow Integrity key and Encryption Key
- The two keys are used in the last phase 1 message and all phase 2 messages
- □ Note the same keys are used in both directions
 ⇒ Reflection attack can cause DoS
- SKEYID = hash (DH values, nonces, cookies, preshared secret if any) ⇒ Key seeds
- prf = pseudo random function (e.g., DES CBC, or HMAC) with two parameters - key and data

IKE Session Keys (Cont)

- Public Signature Authentication: SKEYID = prf(nonces, g^{xy} mod p)
- Public Encryption Authentication: SKEYID = prf(hash(nonces), cookies)
- Pre-share secret key authentication: SKEYID = prf(pre-shared secret key, nonces)
- □ SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, $(g^{xy} \mod p | \operatorname{cookies} | 0))$
- SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, (SKEYID_d | (g^{xy} mod p | cookies
 1)) = Integrity (Authentication) Protection Key
- SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, (SKEYID_a | (g^{xy} mod p | cookies | 2)) = Encryption Key

IKE Session Keys (Cont)


- Proof of identity for initiator = prf(SKEYID, (g^x mod p| g^y mod p|cookies|Initial crypto parameter proposal|Initiator's Identity))
- Proof of identity for responder = prf(SKEYID, (g^x mod p| g^y mod p|cookies|Initial crypto parameter proposal|Responder's Identity))

IKE Message IDs

- IKE messages contain a 32-bit message ID to avoid replay
- □ ISAKMP requires these IDs to be randomly chosen
 ⇒ Difficult to check for replay
- □ Sequence numbers would have been better

IKE Phase 2

- IPsec (AH or ESP) SA can be set up in Phase 2
 ⇒ Negotiate crypto parameters, another optional DH (for perfect forward secrecy), traffic selectors
- Traffic selector = IP address or mask, IP protocol type, and TCP/UDP port #
- □ If traffic selector is wider than the acceptable, the request will be refused
- □ Phase 2 is also known as quick mode



- $\square X = pair of cookies generated in phase 1$
- \Box Y = a 32-bit number to distinguish different phase 2 sessions
- □ CP = Crypto Proposal, CPA = Crypto Proposal Accepted
- X and Y are in clear rest of the phase 2 messages are encrypted with SKEYID_e and integrity protected with SKEYID_a

 $\square_{\text{Washington University in St. Louis}} IV = \text{final cipher text block of the previous message}$

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ISAKMP/IKE Encoding All messages start with a 28-octet fixed header				
# octets				
8	initiator's cookie			
8	responder's cookie			
1	next payload			
1	version number (major/minor)			
1	exchange type			
1	flags			
4	message ID			
4	message length (in units of octets)	(after encryption)		

ISAKMP/IKE Encoding (Cont)

- □ Exchange type: 2=Main mode, 4=aggressive mode, ...
- □ Followed by a sequence of payloads

Type of Next Payload

Length of This Payload

Payload

Type of Next Payload = 0

Length of This Payload

Payload

- □ Payload type:1=SA, 2= Proposal,
- □ Each SA payload consists of multiple proposals (P) payloads.
- □ Each P payload consists of multiple transform (T) payloads
- □ In phase 1, only one P inside SA.
- In phase 2, there can be multiple proposals (protocols), e.g., AH, ESP, AH+ESP, AH+ESP+Compression

T payload consists of a complete choice suite, E.g., Authentication, hash, encryption, DH combination in phase 1 Washington University in St. Louis

Type	Parameters	Description
Security Associ-	Domain of Interpretation, Situ-	Used to negotiate security at-
ation (SA)	ation	tributes and indicate the DOI
		and Situation under which ne-
		gotiation is taking place.
Proposal (P)	Proposal $\#$, Protocol-ID, SPI	Used during SA negotiation; in-
	Size, $\#$ of Transforms, SPI	dicates protocol to be used and
		number of transforms.
Transform (T)	Transform $\#$, Transform-ID,	Used during SA negotiation; in-
	SA Attributes	dicates transform and related
		SA attributes.
Key Exchange	Key Exchange Data	Supports a variety of key ex-
(KE)		change techniques.
Identification	ID Type, ID Data	Used to exchange identification
(ID)		information.
Certificate	Cert Encoding, Certificate Data	Used to transport certificates
(CERT)		and other certificate-related in-
		formation.
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ISAKMP Payload Types (Cont)

Туре	Parameters	Description
° -		1
Certificate	# Cert Types, Certificate	Used to request certificates; in-
Request (CR)	Types, $\#$ Cert Auths, Certifi-	dicates the types of certificates
	cate Authorities	requested and the acceptable
		certificate authorities.
Hash (HASH)	Hash Data	Contains data generated by a
		hash function.
Signature (SIG)	Signature Data	Contains data generated by a
		digital signature function.
Nonce	Nonce Data	Contains a nonce.
(NONCE)		
Notification (N)	DOI, Protocol-ID, SPI Size, No-	Used to transmit notification
	tify Message Type, SPI, Notifi-	data, such as an error condition.
	cation Data	
Delete (D)	DOI, Protocol-ID, SPI Size, $\#$	Indicates an SA that is no
	of SPIs, SPI (one or more)	longer valid.

IKE Version 2

- RFC 4306, December 2005 (V1 in RFC2407, RFC2408, RFC2409, November 1998)
- □ Replaces 8 negotiations methods by single method
- □ Easier to Implement ⇒ Less Interoperability problems ⇒ More deployment
- □ Less vulnerable to DoS



- □ ISAKMP is a framework for key exchange and IKE is a profile of ISAKMP.
- □ IKE consists of 3 documents: ISAKMP, DOI, IKE
- □ IKE consist of 2 Phases.
 - Phase 1 generates SKEYID, SKEYID_a, SKEYID_d Phase 2 generates session keys. Multiple phase 2 per phase 1
- Two modes: Aggressive and Main
- □ Four authentication methods: Shared Secret, Public Encryption Key (Old, revised), Public Signature Key ⇒ Total 8 variants

Homework 14

- □ Read chapter 18 of the text book
- □ Submit answer to the Exercise 18.3
- Exercise 18.3: Show how someone who knows both Alice's and Bob's Public encryption keys (and neither side's private key) can construct an entire IKE exchange based on public encryption keys that appears to be between Alice and Bob. (Hint: Show that a third party can create a valid exchange shown in Figure 18-6, 18-7, 18-8 without knowing the private keys. Note that the proof of identity consists of a hash of the nonce sent by the other side.)